About Me

I am a researcher, developer, and entrepreneur with a Ph.D. and an M.Sc. in the Cyber Security track of the Information Systems Engineering Department at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. I also hold a B.Sc. in Computer Science and Bioinformatics.

I am the co-founder of Voyage81, a deep-tech computer vision startup acquired by IL MAKIAGE. IL MAKIAGE later grew into ODDITY, the parent company of IL MAKIAGE.

Following the acquisition, I served as VP of Information Security at ODDITY, where I was part of the company’s journey to becoming a publicly traded company on Nasdaq under the ticker $ODD. I am now an independent cybersecurity advisor.

I am a former member of the Implementation Security and Side-Channel Lab under Dr. Yossi Oren.

My fields of research include:

• Mobile hardware security, especially “hardware meets software” scenarios.
• Side-channel information leakage.

Press

• Globes coverage of the Voyage81 acquisition
• IL MAKIAGE Acquires Leading Israeli Computer Vision Startup Voyage81

Publications

• 2020
  • Omer Shwartz, Amir Cohen, Asaf Shabtai and Yossi Oren. Inner conflict: How smart device components can cause harm. In Elsevier Computers & Security.
• 2018
  • Omer Shwartz, Yael Mathov, Michael Bohadana, Yuval Elovici and Yossi Oren. Reverse Engineering IoT Devices: Effective Techniques and Methods. In IEEE Internet of Things Journal.
  • Rom Ogen, Omer Shwartz, Kfir Zvi and Yossi Oren. Sensorless, Permissionless Information Exfiltration with Wi-Fi Micro-Jamming. In 12th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies--WOOT, 2018.
• 2017
  • Omer Shwartz, Yael Mathov, Michael Bohadana, Yuval Elovici and Yossi Oren. Opening Pandora's Box: Effective Techniques for Reverse Engineering IoT Devices. In 17th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference (CARDIS 2017), 2017.
  • Omer Shwartz, Amir Cohen, Asaf Shabtai, and Yossi Oren. Shattered Trust: When Replacement Smartphone Components Attack. In 11th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies--WOOT, 2017.

  In the press:

  The Register - How to pwn phones with shady replacement parts.

  Ars Technica - Secret chips in replacement parts can completely hijack your phone’s security.

  Boing Boing - Hiding malware in boobytrapped replacement screens would undetectably compromise your mobile device.

  Sophos - Touchscreens ‘at risk from chip in the middle attack’, warn researchers.

  Heise [German] - Handy-Ersatzteile können Malware einschleusen.

  Mako [Hebrew] - חוקרים ישראלים מזהירים: אל תתקנו את הסמארטפון

  • Omer Shwartz, Guy Shitrit, Asaf Shabtai, and Yossi Oren. From smashed screens to smashed stacks: Attacking mobile phones using malicious aftermarket parts. In Workshop on Security for Embedded and Mobile Systems (SEMS 2017), 2017.
• 2014
  • Ruth Barshir, Omer Shwartz, Ilan Y. Smoly and Esti Yeger-Lotem. Comparative Analysis of Human Tissue Interactomes Reveals Factors Leading to Tissue-Specific Manifestation of Hereditary Diseases. PLOS Comput Biol 10, no. 6 (2014): e1003632.

CVEs

• CVE-2017-0650 - An information disclosure vulnerability in the Synaptics touchscreen driver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels.

Academic Contact Information

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